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April 2025: A Historic Treaty on Hold
In late April 2025, a decades-old symbol of India-Pakistan cooperation was suddenly thrown into uncertainty. On April 23, 2025, India’s Foreign Secretary announced that the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 with Pakistan would be “held in abeyance with immediate effect”. This dramatic suspension came in direct response to a shooting in Pahalgam (Jammu & Kashmir) that killed 26 people, including tourists. India accused Pakistan-based elements of orchestrating the attack and, in a bold move, decided to pause the treaty until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably” acted against cross-border terrorism. The Indus Waters Treaty had endured 65 years and even survived three wars between India and Pakistan. Now, however, it faces an uncertain future, raising serious questions about water security and bilateral relations.
This latest development is unprecedented. By suspending the IWT, India signaled it is willing to use water as leverage amidst heightened tensions. The immediate implication is that India could halt the flow of Indus system rivers into Pakistan, a move with potentially dire humanitarian impact on Pakistan’s population and agriculture. Pakistan, as the downstream nation, is alarmed, millions depend on the Indus River and its tributaries for their livelihood. Islamabad has condemned India’s suspension as a unilateral violation of an international treaty (which traditionally could not be altered or terminated unilaterally) and is likely exploring diplomatic and legal recourse.
The world too has taken note: the Indus Waters Treaty has long been hailed as a cornerstone of “water diplomacy”, and its unraveling could set a troubling precedent. To fully grasp the gravity of this moment, it is important to understand what the Indus Waters Treaty is, so let’s get into the details.
Background: Origins of the Indus Waters Treaty
The Indus Waters Treaty also known as the “Sindh Tas Muahida” was born from necessity in the early years of India and Pakistan’s existence. After the Partition of British India in 1947, the subcontinent was divided into two new countries, but the rivers flowing through the Indus Basin could not be neatly partitioned. The Indus River system, comprising six major rivers, spans both India and Pakistan (as well as parts of China and Afghanistan). Immediately after Partition, disputes arose over sharing these waters. In 1948, India (the upper riparian) briefly cut off water flow from canals that irrigated Pakistani lands, sparking panic in the agrarian Pakistan. This incident, occurring in the backdrop of the first India-Pakistan war over Kashmir (1947–48), made it clear that a long-term agreement was needed to prevent “water wars” between the two neighbors.
Through the 1950s, intense negotiations took place, mediated by the World Bank. Both nations had starkly different positions: India argued for a new allocation of waters based on sovereignty and equitable use, while Pakistan insisted on retaining the pre-Partition usage rights to support its predominantly agricultural economy. The World Bank’s involvement was crucial in bridging this gap. After years of deadlock and even a near breakdown of talks, a compromise formula emerged by mid-1950s. The solution involved a partition of the rivers themselves, giving certain rivers entirely to one country and the rest to the other, rather than trying to share each river’s waters proportionally.
Another major hurdle was financing: if Pakistan were to relinquish some rivers to India, it would need to build dams and canals to divert water from the remaining rivers to its eastern regions. Initially, the plan was for India to pay for this infrastructure as compensation, but India refused. Finally, a consortium of international partners (including the US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and West Germany) and the World Bank created the Indus Basin Development Fund to finance Pakistan’s replacement works. This external funding arrangement removed the last obstacle. On September 19, 1960, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in Karachi by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan, with World Bank President W.A.B. Iliff signing as a witness. The treaty took effect retroactively from April 1, 1960.
The context and reasons for the treaty’s creation thus lay in averting conflict and ensuring each country could develop its agriculture and economy. By clearly delineating rights to the Indus basin rivers, the IWT sought to provide a stable framework for water sharing. It was essentially a partition of rivers: a practical solution to an otherwise intractable dispute. The World Bank’s role as mediator and guarantor gave both sides confidence that the terms would be respected. Indeed, the Indus Waters Treaty has often been cited as a model of conflict resolution, a rare example of India and Pakistan cooperating despite their hostile relations. In the 65 years since, no full-scale war has been fought over water, and the treaty largely kept the peace on the water-sharing front. As we will see, even when India and Pakistan fought wars (1965, 1971, 1999) or faced crises, the water flows continued unabated, until now.
Main Provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty
The Indus Waters Treaty’s main points can be summarized through its division of rivers and the rules it established for water distribution and usage. In simple terms, the treaty split the Indus River system between the two countries, a unique approach that has defined rights and obligations to this day. Key provisions include:
Division of Rivers (Eastern vs. Western):
The Indus system has six major rivers. The treaty designates the three “Eastern Rivers”, the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, to India’s exclusive use, and the three “Western Rivers”, the Indus main stem, Jhelum, and Chenab, to Pakistan’s exclusive use. In effect, India got full rights over the smaller eastern tributaries, while Pakistan got the larger western rivers that carry about 80% of the total basin flow. By volume, India’s share is about 20%–30% of the Indus waters, and Pakistan’s is about 70%–80%. This clear separation was intended to minimize overlap and disputes.
Water Distribution and Use:
While Pakistan enjoys uninterrupted flow of the Western Rivers, the treaty permits India limited uses on those rivers. India can undertake “non-consumptive” uses on the Western Rivers, such as hydroelectric power generation, navigation, fishing, etc., as long as it does not diminish or divert the water flow downstream. India is also allowed to irrigate up to 709,000 acres of land using water from the Western Rivers, and to store a small amount of water (for purposes like power generation and flood control) under strict regulations. However, India cannot build storage or diversion works that would materially reduce the water reaching Pakistan. On the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej), India can use 100% of the water (for irrigation, cities, industries, etc.), after supplying some necessities to Pakistan for a limited transitional period that ended in the 1970s. Pakistan, for its part, had to develop alternative irrigation for its eastern districts (previously fed by Ravi/Sutlej) by tapping the Western rivers via new canals and reservoirs.
Permanent Indus Commission:
The treaty established a Permanent Indus Commission with a commissioner from each country. The Commission’s role is to exchange data, inspect projects, and meet annually to resolve routine matters. This institution has been an important confidence-building measure, keeping communication open even during wartime. The Commission serves as the first line of dispute resolution, if any “question” or concern arises about treaty implementation, the commissioners try to resolve it bilaterally.
Dispute Resolution Mechanism:
For more serious disagreements that cannot be settled by the Commission, the IWT lays out a hierarchical dispute resolution process. A “difference” (more complex than a question) can be referred to a Neutral Expert appointed by the World Bank. A “dispute” (major conflict on treaty interpretation) can be referred to a Court of Arbitration, an ad-hoc panel with members appointed by the two countries and impartial umpires facilitated by the World Bank. This two-tier mechanism has been invoked multiple times (as we’ll explore later) and is a key legal feature that has helped avoid deadlocks. Importantly, the World Bank as a third party has a defined facilitative role in this process, ensuring that if India and Pakistan cannot agree on choosing experts or judges, the Bank can step in to appoint them so the process moves forward.
Goodwill and No War Clause:
The treaty’s preamble emphasizes cooperation “in a spirit of goodwill, friendship and cooperation”. Unlike some other international pacts, the IWT remarkably continued to function even during India-Pakistan wars, there is no provision allowing suspension during war. In fact, even at the height of conflicts, India never cut off Pakistan’s water supply until the 2025 decision. This reflects the understanding that water is a lifeline that should transcend conflict. Pakistan, being downstream, has historically feared that India could use its upstream position to create artificial floods or droughts, especially in wartime. The treaty’s robustness has allayed many of those fears over the years.
The Indus Waters Treaty main points ensure that Pakistan receives the bulk of the Indus basin’s waters, while India, though it ceded claim to 75-80% of the water, obtained security to develop the smaller rivers in its territory without objection. In essence, India got water for the areas east of Punjab, and Pakistan got water for the rest. The Indus water treaty rivers division was a permanent water-sharing pact that both nations agreed to adhere to “in perpetuity.” It is often noted in “Indus Water Treaty PDF notes” and study guides (including those for UPSC, India’s civil service exams) that this treaty is one of the most significant international water agreements. Maps of the Indus basin typically show a stark line: the Ravi-Beas-Sutlej flowing entirely into India (with new dams and canals built by India), and the Indus-Jhelum-Chenab flowing through India’s Kashmir but then entirely to Pakistan (with India’s usage limited to run-of-the-river projects). These arrangements, spelled out in the treaty’s 8 articles and multiple annexures, have formed the bedrock of Indus water distribution for over six decades.
Role of International Actors (Especially the World Bank)
The World Bank has been intimately involved with the Indus Waters Treaty from the very start. In fact, the IWT is often cited as one of the World Bank’s greatest successes in conflict mediation. In the 1950s, it was Eugene Black, the World Bank president, who offered the Bank’s good offices to break the India-Pakistan impasse. World Bank engineers and experts helped propose the initial division of rivers plan. The Bank hosted years of negotiations in Washington and elsewhere, and its representatives traveled frequently to Delhi and Karachi to coax agreement. When the treaty was finally signed in 1960, the World Bank became a signatory to certain clauses, not as an enforcer per se, but as a facilitator and monitor.
One critical contribution was the Indus Basin Development Fund arrangement. The World Bank coordinated financial contributions of about $1 billion (a huge sum in the 1960s) from Western countries to fund Pakistan’s construction of dams (like **Mangla Dam on the Jhelum, completed 1967, and Tarbela Dam on the Indus, completed 1976), as well as a network of link canals to reroute water from western rivers to the eastern plains that lost river supply. This allowed Pakistan to agree to India’s full use of the Eastern Rivers, essentially, the world community paid to build Pakistan an alternative water system. India too contributed some funds as part of the settlement (acknowledging this, PM Nehru told the Indian Parliament that India had “paid” for a water peace). This massive engineering effort in the 1960s and 1970s, sometimes called the Indus Basin Project, stands as one of the largest water development programs in the world, and it was a direct outcome of the treaty, supervised in part by the World Bank.
Beyond the initial implementation, the World Bank’s role has been that of a guarantor and referee. The treaty specifies that in case of an unresolved difference or dispute, the World Bank (or a person appointed by it) will appoint the Neutral Expert or the members of the Court of Arbitration, if the parties cannot agree. For example, during the Baglihar Dam dispute in 2005, when Pakistan approached the Bank, it was the World Bank that appointed the Neutral Expert (Prof. Raymond Lafitte) after determining the issue was a “difference” requiring a neutral evaluation. Again, in the Kishanganga case, when Pakistan demanded a Court of Arbitration and India a Neutral Expert in 2016, the World Bank initially paused proceedings to persuade both sides to pick one forum. Eventually, parallel processes moved ahead, with the World Bank facilitating the selection of panelists. Even in recent years, the Bank has tried to keep the dispute resolution process on track despite India-Pakistan disagreements over procedure.
Apart from the World Bank, other international actors have had roles, albeit more limited. The Western powers who funded the Indus Basin Development Fund (USA, Canada, UK, etc.) had a stake in ensuring stability in South Asia during the Cold War. They viewed the Indus treaty as crucial to preventing India-Pakistan wars (and by extension, curbing Soviet influence that might expand amid chaos). The treaty was somewhat a product of that Cold War context of international intervention for peace-building. Later, in some of the arbitration cases under the treaty, international jurists and experts got involved. The Kishanganga arbitration (2010-2013) was held at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, with a panel including European judges, and its chairman was a neutral appointed by the UN Secretary General and World Bank President. Such involvement lent credibility and neutrality to the decisions.
China, while not involved in the IWT directly, is an upper riparian on the Indus (Tibet region) and has cooperated with Pakistan on other water projects (like the Bunji dam proposal). Some analysts speculate about China’s view, notably, if the Indus treaty collapsed, Pakistan might seek more Chinese help to build storage or even diplomatic support if water conflict escalates. However, China has traditionally kept a low profile on Indus waters, and as a fellow upper riparian (on the Brahmaputra with India), China might not want to set a precedent encouraging downstream countries to internationalize river disputes.
Finally, there’s the question of whether the United Nations or other international law forums could play a role now. If Pakistan were to formally accuse India of violating the treaty, it could appeal to the UN Security Council or International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the past, such routes were not pursued because the treaty mechanisms sufficed and both countries prefer to avoid third-party arbitration on political issues. But a treaty suspension might force new international mediation. The World Bank itself has been placed in a delicate position in 2025, it had been handling separate processes for earlier disputes, and now one party (India) is suspending the whole treaty framework. The Bank would likely urge both sides to negotiate, but its leverage is limited beyond what the treaty spells out.
The World Bank’s imprint is on every page of the Indus Waters Treaty’s story, from genesis to implementation to dispute resolution. The role of international actors has generally been to support the treaty’s continuity (financially, legally, or diplomatically). The current crisis will test the international community’s commitment to that principle: will there be quiet pressure on India to resume compliance? Will back-channel talks emerge? The Indus, after all, doesn’t just flow through two countries, it has the attention of many more.
The Bottom Line: A Treaty at a Crossroads
The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty in April 2025 marks a turning point not only in India-Pakistan relations but also in global water diplomacy. For over six decades, the IWT served as a rare example of cooperation between two nuclear-armed rivals, withstanding wars, diplomatic freezes, and even terrorism-related crises. Its sudden suspension following the Pahalgam attack signals a shift, where water, once treated as a shared resource above politics, may now become a strategic tool in regional power dynamics.
This development is more than symbolic. It raises urgent questions about water security, humanitarian risks, and legal frameworks. Millions in Pakistan rely on uninterrupted flow from the Indus system for agriculture, drinking water, and daily survival. India’s move, though framed as temporary, casts uncertainty over decades of trust-building and sets a precedent that water treaties can be paused under political duress, something international law has traditionally discouraged.
The coming months will be critical. Will Pakistan seek arbitration or international legal action? Will India formalize its suspension or agree to dialogue? Will the World Bank step in to mediate once again? Most importantly, will both nations realize that while borders may divide them, rivers must continue to connect them?
In an age of climate stress and growing resource competition, the Indus Waters Treaty’s future will shape not only South Asia’s stability but global norms on transboundary water sharing. What happens next will either preserve a fragile peace, or open the floodgates to further conflict.
Image Credit: Ali Madad Sakhirani
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